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Literalism and Contextualism: Some Varieties 
FRANÇOIS RECANATI 
 
According to the dominant position in the philosophy of language, we may 
legitimately ascribe truth-conditional content to sentences, independently of the 
speech act which the sentence is used to perform. This position, which I call 
'Literalism', contrasts with another view, reminiscent of that held by ordinary language 
philosophers half a century ago. That other view, which I call ‘Contextualism’, holds 
that speech acts are the primary bearers of content. Only in the context of a speech 
act does a sentence express a determinate content.1 
 Both Literalism and Contextualism come in many varieties. There are radical, 
and less radical, versions of both Literalism and Contextualism. Some intermediate 
positions are mixtures of Literalism and Contextualism. In this paper I will describe 
several literalist positions, several contextualist positions, and a couple of 
intermediate positions. My aim is to convince the reader that the 
Literalism/Contextualism controversy is far from being settled. 
In the first section, I will look at the historical development of Literalism. We will 
see that this development reveals a gradual weakening. The question that naturally 
arises is: How far can we go in this direction? Where will this tendency ultimately lead 
us? And the obvious answer is: to Contextualism. In the second section I will 
describe the steps which, from a critique of the currently dominant literalist position 
(Minimalism), can lead to Contextualism. In the last three sections I will describe 
various contextualist positions, and I will discuss possible literalist replies to the 
contextualist challenge. 
 
I. The Development of Literalism 
 
Indexicality raises a prima facie difficulty for Literalism — a difficulty that was 
emphasized by its contextualist opponents. Indexical sentences possess a 
determinate (truth-evaluable) content only when uttered. Hence it is not obvious that 
such sentences, qua grammatical entities, possess content. As the ordinary language 
philosophers used to insist, we must draw a distinction between the sentence and the 
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 As James Conant (1998) pointed out, this is a Wittgensteinian extension of Frege's Context Principle. 
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statement it is used to make. The content is the content of the statement, and only 
derivatively that of the sentence that is used to make that statement. 
But indexicality is a feature of natural language sentences, and the 
philosophers in the literalist tradition were not originally concerned with natural 
language. They were primarily concerned with the formal languages of logic and, 
through them, with ‘language’ in general. Vernacular languages such as English or 
French were considered messy and defective. It is only in the middle of the twentieth-
century that things began to change, and that a descriptive attitude was adopted 
toward natural language within the literalist tradition.2 Before that change occurred, 
context-sensitivity was taken to be a defect of natural language, like ambiguity. The 
fact that natural language sentences are indexical and therefore carry content only 
when uttered could therefore be deliberately ignored. Let us refer to this view (or 
rather, this attitude) as 'Proto-Literalism'. 
Next in the development of the literalist tradition came 'Eternalism'. In contrast 
to Proto-Literalism, Eternalism was a substantial view regarding the phenomenon of 
indexicality in natural language. Indexicality was regarded as not essential from a 
theoretical standpoint. It was so considered because the following principle was 
widely accepted: 
 
Eternalization Principle 
For every statement that can be made in a natural language using a context-
sensitive sentence in a given context, there is an eternal sentence, in that 
language (or in a suitable extension of that language), which can be used to 
make the same statement in any context.3 
 
Thus indexicality turns out to be eliminable. Were it not for the necessities of practical 
life, we might utter only eternal sentences. 
The Eternalization Principle has progressively been abandoned. It is now more 
or less accepted that natural language sentences are irreducibly context-sensitive. 
Some theorists even doubt the existence of eternal sentences in natural language. 
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 See e.g. Reichenbach (1947), Bar-Hillel (1954). 
3
 To obtain an eternal sentence from a context-sensitive one, one has only to replace the indexical constituents of 
the latter by non-indexical constituents with the same semantic value. 
 3 
Eternalism, therefore, is out. But there still are fallback positions for Literalism. Indeed 
Literalism has been maintained, in progressively weaker forms, until today. 
The strongest fallback position for Literalism consists in acknowledging the 
extent (and ineliminability) of context-dependence, while insisting that it still is the 
sentence which, in virtue of the rules of the langage, expresses a content in context. 
This semantic notion of the content of a sentence (with respect to context) is held to 
be distinct from the pragmatic notion of the content of a speech act. For it is the 
linguistic conventions, not the speaker's intentions (or the hearer’s beliefs regarding 
the speaker’s intentions), which fix the content of the sentence with respect to 
context. Hence the name 'Conventionalism' for the view that the truth-conditions of a 
sentence are fixed by the rules of the language independently of pragmatic 
considerations. What determines the content of an indexical expression is not what is 
in the head of the language users, but a linguistic rule — the rule which constitutes 
the conventional meaning of that expression. As Barwise and Perry write, ‘even if I 
am fully convinced that I am Napoleon, my use of « I » designates me, not him. 
Similarly, I may be fully convinced that it is 1789, but it does not make my use of 
« now » about a time in 1789’ (Barwise and Perry, 1983: 148). It can therefore be 
maintained that natural language sentences possess a content (with respect to 
context) independently of the speech act which it is used to perform. The content of 
the speech act arguably depends upon the communicative intentions of the speaker 
which the utterance makes manifest to the hearer; but the content of the sentence is 
fixed directly by the rules of the language — with respect to context, admittedly, but 
independently of both the speaker's intentions and their recognition by the hearer. 
Conventionalism replaced Eternalism when the Eternalization Principle was 
abandoned; and it is still has advocates today. But Conventionalism is no longer the 
dominant position. It is widely acknowledged that the speaker's meaning has a role to 
play in fixing the truth-conditions of indexical sentences. To be sure, the reference of 
a pure indexical like ‘I’ is determined by a linguistic rule: the rule that ‘I’ refers to the 
speaker. But the reference of a demonstrative is not determined by a rule in this 
manner. It is generally assumed that there is such a rule, namely the rule that the 
demonstrative refers to the object which happens to be demonstrated or which 
happens to be the most salient, in the context at hand. But the notions of 
‘demonstration’ and ‘salience’ are pragmatic notions in disguise. Ultimately, a 
demonstrative refers to what the speaker who uses it refers to by using it. Semantic 
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reference turns out to be parasitic on speaker's reference here. Even expressions 
like ‘here’ and ‘now’ which Kaplan classifies as pure indexicals (as opposed to 
demonstratives) are highly sensitive to the speaker's intent. The alleged rule of 
reference which is said to govern them is the rule that they refer to be the time or 
place of the context respectively; but what counts as the time and place of the 
context? How inclusive must the time or place in question be? It depends on what the 
speaker means, so that determining the content of words like 'here' and 'now' 
ultimately is a matter of pragmatics. 
 The alleged automaticity of content-determination and its independence from 
pragmatic considerations is an illusion due to an excessive concern with a sub-class 
of ‘pure indexicals’, namely words such as ‘I’, ‘today’, etc. In most cases, however, 
the reference of a context-sensitive expression is determined on a pragmatic basis.4 
That is true not only of standard indexical expressions, but also of many 
constructions involving something like a free variable. For example, a possessive 
phrase such as ‘John’s car’ arguably means something like the car that bears relation 
R to John. The free variable ‘R’ must be contextually assigned a particular value; but 
that value is not determined by a rule. What a given occurrence of the phrase ‘John’s 
car’ means ultimately depends upon what the speaker who utters it means. That 
dependence upon speaker's meaning is a characteristic feature of semantically 
underdeterminate expressions, which are pervasive in natural language. Their 
semantic value varies from occurrence to occurrence, yet it varies not as a function of 
some objective feature of the situation of utterance but as a function of what the 
speaker means. 
So we cannot maintain that the content of the sentence is fixed in context by 
linguistic rules. We must acknowledge the role of pragmatic considerations in 
determining truth-conditional content. This means that we must depart from 
Conventionalism; but there still is an ultimate fallback position for Literalism. 
According to that position, which I call 'Minimalism', the appeal to speaker's meaning 
in determining truth-conditional content is not free and unconstrained, but regulated 
by linguistic conventions. We appeal to speaker's meaning only when there is, in the 
meaning of the sentence type, a 'slot' to be filled pragmatically. 
In the minimalist framework, the semantic content of the utterance departs 
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only minimally from the linguistic meaning of the sentence type (hence the name 
'Minimalism'); it departs from it only when the meaning of the sentence itself requires 
that some contextual value be assigned to a context-sensitive word or morpheme, or 
to a free variable in logical form. The contextual assignment of values to indexicals 
and free variables is allowed to affect semantic content, because it is a bottom-up, 
linguistically controlled pragmatic process, i.e. a pragmatic process triggered (and 
made obligatory) by a linguistic expression in the sentence itself. But no other 
contextual influence is allowed to affect semantic content. In particular, 'top-down' 
pragmatic processes are banned. Such processes are not triggered by a particular 
expression in virtue of a linguistic rule, but take place in order to make sense of the 
speaker's communicative act in context. For example, sometimes we interpret what 
the speaker says nonliterally, because a literal interpretation would clash with the 
presumption that the speaker respects Grice's Cooperative Principle. Because they 
are not linguistically controlled, such interpretive processes have no impact on truth-
conditions, according to Minimalism. They can only affect the overall content of the 
speech act performed by the speaker. 
To sum up, four stages can be discerned in the historical development of the 
literalist tradition that started with Frege and is still dominant today. First came Proto-
Literalism, according to which context-sensitivity is a defect of a natural language, to 
be ignored in theorizing about language. Then came Eternalism, which holds that 
indexicality is a practical convenience rather than an essential feature of natural 
language. Next came Conventionalism — the view that the conventional meaning of 
the sentence-type fully determines the content of the sentence (in context) 
independently of the speaker's meaning. Finally, Minimalism acknowedges the role of 
speaker's meaning in determining truth-conditions, but insists that the appeal to 
speaker's meaning is always subordinated to (controlled by) the conventional 
meaning of the sentence. 
 
II. Towards Contextualism 
 
As we have just seen, the strong forms of Literalism have been replaced by 
progressively weaker forms, in the historical development of the tradition stemming 
from Frege's work. How far will that process go? The currently accepted position is 
Minimalism. Will Minimalism be superseded by still weaker positions, and if so, at 
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what point will Literalism have to be squarely given up in favour of Contextualism? 
These are the questions I address in this section. 
According to Minimalism, no contextual influences are allowed to affect the 
truth-conditional content of an utterance unless the sentence itself demands it. Yet, 
sometimes, the truth-conditions of an utterance seem to be affected by context in a 
top-down manner. For example, if I say 'It is raining', I mean that it is raining where I 
am (or at another contextually salient place), but nothing in the sentence seems to 
correspond to the place, which is provided by context without being linguistically 
'articulated' (Perry, 1986). Faced with such cases, a defender of Minimalism has two 
options. He (or she) may bravely re-analyse the example so as to show that the 
pragmatic process at issue — here, the provision of a specific place — is a bottom-up 
process triggered by some expression in the sentence, appearances 
notwithstanding. Thus he may posit a free location variable in the logical form of the 
sentence (Stanley, 2000).5 Alternatively, the minimalist may draw a distinction 
between the semantic content of the sentence (here, the location-less proposition 
that it's raining at some place or other) and the content actually conveyed (viz. the 
proposition that it's raining where the speaker is). In contrast to the former, the latter 
need not obey the minimalist constraint. 
The second of the two positions I have just described as available to the 
minimalist concedes that there are pragmatic processes that affect the interpretation 
of an utterance in a top-down manner, and that affect it at the level of (intuitive) truth-
conditions. Therefore, by choosing this option rather than the first one, we move one 
step further in the direction of Contextualism. But we remain within the confines of 
Literalism because we maintain that the content of the sentence is the 'minimal' 
proposition determined by the linguistic meaning of the sentence when indexicals, 
free variables and other context-sensitive elements have been assigned contextual 
values. This position — which I call 'the Syncretic View' (Recanati, 2001, 2004) — is 
a compromise. On the one hand, the semantic content of the sentence is said to 
obey the minimalist constraint; on the other hand the intuitive content of the utterance 
can be freely enriched, as in this typical example from Scott Soames: 
 
A man goes into a coffee shop and sits at the counter. The waitress asks him 
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what he wants. He says, "I would like coffee, please." The sentence uttered is 
unspecific in several respects — its semantic content does not indicate 
whether the coffee is to be in form of beans, grounds, or liquid, nor does it 
indicate whether the amount in question is a drop, a cup, a gallon, a sack, or a 
barrel. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the situation what the man has in mind, 
and the waitress is in no doubt about what to do. She brings him a cup of 
frehsly brewed coffee. If asked to describe the transaction, she might well say, 
"He ordered a cup of coffee" or "He said he wanted a cup of coffee", meaning, 
of course, the brewed, drinkable kind. In so doing, she would, quite correctly, 
be reporting the content of the man's order, or assertion, as going beyond the 
semantic content of the sentence he uttered. (Soames, 2002 : 78) 
 
Free enrichment — the process responsible for making the interpretation of an 
utterance more specific than its literal interpretation (as when 'coffee' is contextually 
understood as coffee of the brewed, drinkable kind) — is a top-down, pragmatically 
controlled pragmatic process. Another process of the same sort, 'predicate transfer' 
(Nunberg, 1995), takes us from a certain property, conventionally expressed by some 
predicative expression, to a distinct property bearing a systematic relation to it. For 
example, in 'I am parked out back', the property that is literally encoded by the verb 
phrase is a property of cars (the property of being parked out back), but the property 
which the expression actually contributes to the (intuitive) truth-conditions in this 
utterance is not a property of cars but another, systematically related property, 
namely the property a car-owner has when his or her car has the former property. In 
an utterance such as 'I am parked out back', transfer takes place because there is a 
linguistic mismatch between the predicate (which denotes a property of cars) and 
what it is applied to (a person). But such mismatch is not necessary for predicate 
transfer. Just as, through transfer, 'The ham sandwich left without paying' is 
understood as saying something about the customer who ordered the sandwich, 'The 
ham sandwich stinks' can be so understood, in a suitable context, even though the 
property of stinking potentially applies to sandwiches as well as to customers. Like 
free enrichment, the process of transfer is not a linguistically controlled but a 
pragmatically controlled pragmatic process: it is not triggered by something linguistic 
— some aspect of the linguistic signal being processed — but takes place in order to 
make sense of the communicative act performed by the speaker. 
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Predicate transfer and free enrichment are only two among a family of top-
down pragmatic processes that affect the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances. This 
family of processes I call 'modulation', as opposed to the (bottom-up) process of 
assigning contextual values to indexicals, free variables etc. (Recanati, 2004). The 
Syncretic View acknowledges modulation, but limits its effects to the intuitive content 
of the utterance, that is, to the content of the speech act performed by the speaker. 
The content of the sentence (the 'minimal proposition' it expresses) is said to be 
unaffected, in accordance with Minimalism. But the Syncretic View can be criticized, 
on the grounds that the 'minimal proposition' it posits has no useful work to do. It is 
supposed to give us the semantic content of the sentence (as opposed to the content 
of the speech act), but do we really need to posit such a level of semantic content for 
the global sentence? Maybe we don't. What must ultimately be accounted for is what 
speakers say in the pragmatic sense — the content of their assertions (or of 
whatever speech acts they perform by their utterances). The job of linguistic 
meanings, semantic contents etc. is to contribute to the overall explanation. But, one 
may argue, it is sufficient to assign semantic contents (in context) to simple 
expressions. Modulation will operate on those contents, and the composition rules 
will compose the resulting senses, thereby yielding the content of the speaker's 
assertion. Of course it is possible to let the composition rules compose the plain 
semantic contents of the constituent expressions, thereby yielding the minimal 
proposition expressed by the sentence (an absurd proposition, in many cases). 
However, the content of the speaker's assertion will still be determined by composing 
the modulated senses resulting from the operation of pragmatic processes on the 
contents of the constituent expressions; so it is unclear what additional job the 
minimal proposition is supposed to be doing.6 
Many people think that we need the minimal proposition because it is the input 
to the pragmatic processes which take us from what the speaker literally says to what 
she actually conveys. Those processes are said to operate globally on the output of 
the grammar. But that view has been rightly criticized. In 'There is a lion in the 
courtyard', 'lion' can be understood, through transfer, in the representational sense: 
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the thing that is said to be in the courtyard is not a (real) lion but a representation 
(more specifically, a statue) of lion. Now consider 'There is a stone lion in the 
courtyard'. What is said to be made of stone here? Clearly, it is the statue,  rather 
than the lion which the statue represents. This simple fact shows that the process of 
representational transfer must take place before the composition rule associated with 
the noun-noun construction applies to the semantic values of the nouns 'stone' and 
'lion'.7 If predicate transfer applied globally, after the grammatically triggered 
composition rules have applied, the interpretation we would get for the noun-phrase 
'a stone lion' would be something like: a representation of (a lion that is made of 
stone). But the correct interpretation is: (a representation of a lion) that is made of 
stone. We must therefore give up the Gricean idea that pragmatic processes operate 
globally on the output of the grammar.8 And this means that we don't really need the 
'minimal proposition'. 
The position I have just described I call 'Quasi-Contextualism'. It is very close 
to full-fledged Contextualism, but to get to the latter we need to take one more step. 
So far we have granted that the pragmatic processes involved in modulation 
(free enrichment, transfer, etc.) are optional. For example, nothing prevents the 
sentence 'There is a lion in the courtyard' from being understood literally, as talking 
about a real lion. Or consider the following instance of free enrichment: 
  
She took out her key and opened the door 
 
The pragmatic process that enriches the meaning of this sentence so as to convey 
both a sense of temporal order (giving to 'and' the sense of 'and then') and a notion of 
the intrument used in opening the door (giving to 'opened the door' the sense of 
'opened the door with the key') — that process might also not take place. As Grice 
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emphasized, such pragmatic suggestions are always cancellable, explicitly or 
contextually. Once the pragmatic suggestion has been cancelled, what the words 
contribute to truth-conditional content is their bare linguistic senses. 
 From the optional character of modulation, it follows that the minimal 
proposition, even if it plays no causal-explanatory role, has at least the following, 
counterfactual status: it is the proposition which the utterance would express if no 
pragmatic process of modulation took place (Recanati, 1993: 318). To get full-fledged 
Contextualism we must deprive the minimal proposition even of this counterfactual 
status. While Quasi-Contextualism considers the minimal proposition as a 
theoretically useless entity, and denies that it plays any effective role in 
communication, Contextualism goes much further: it denies that the notion even 
makes sense. Contextualism ascribes to modulation a form of necessity which makes 
it ineliminable. Without contextual modulation, no proposition could be expressed — 
that is the gist of Contextualism. In this framework the notion of a 'minimal' 
proposition collapses: there is no proposition that is expressed in a purely 'bottom-up' 
manner. 
 
III. Pragmatic Composition 
 
To say that the pragmatic processes of modulation are optional is to say that in a 
suitable context, the senses expressed by the words would be, simply, the senses 
they possess in virtue of the rules of the language. The first of the three contextualist 
positions I am about to discuss — the Pragmatic Composition view (PC) — accepts 
that the literal, input sense undergoing modulation could, in a suitable context, be the 
expressed sense. So it construes the pragmatic processes of modulation as optional. 
But it construes them as optional only with respect to the word whose sense is 
modulated. If we consider not words in isolation, but the complex expressions in 
which they occur, we see that the pragmatic processes of modulation are not always 
contingent and dispensable, but often essential. Even though the linguistic meaning 
of a given word (or the semantic content we get after indexical resolution) could be 
the expressed sense, still the process of semantic composition, i.e. the putting 
together of that sense with the senses of other expressions, cannot proceed unless 
appropriate adjustments take place so as to make the parts fit together within an 
appropriate whole. On this view words have meanings which could go directly into 
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the interpretation, without modulation, but it is the composition process that forces 
modulation to take place, or at least invites it: often the meanings of individual words 
do not cohere by themselves, and can be fitted together only by undergoing a 
process of mutual adjustment. 
Let us start with a simple example in which modulation is required to overcome 
a semantic mismatch:9 
 
 John hears the piano. 
 
The verb 'hear' arguably denotes a relation between sentient organisms and sounds. 
Only sounds can be heard. Since a piano is not a sound, but a musical instrument, 
some adjustment is needed to make sense of 'hear the piano': either the noun-phrase 
'the piano' must be given a metonymical interpretation, so that it stands for the 
sounds emitted by the  piano; or (more plausibly) the verb 'hear' itself must be 
understood, not in its basic sense, but in a derived sense resulting from semantic 
transfer. An object is heard in the derived sense whenever the sound it emits is heard 
in the literal, basic sense. 
We need to adjust or modulate the meaning of words even in the absence of 
linguistic mismatch. Think of an example like 
 
John hates the piano. 
 
A piano is certainly an object that can be hated, however strictly one construes the 
predicate 'hate'. Still, some contextual enrichment is in order, because to hate the 
piano is to hate it under some aspect or dimension. One may hate the sounds 
emitted by the piano, or one can hate playing the piano, or one can hate the piano as 
a piece of furniture, etc. The relevant dimension is contextually provided through the 
process of enrichment. (Similarly, if I say that Jim likes John's sister, the sense of 
'like' will be — defeasibly — modulated so as to mean something different from what 
it means in 'Jim likes pork'.) 
 The crucial question is whether the sentence expresses a proposition 
independently of this type of modulation. To address this issue, let us consider 
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another example, due to John Searle. The word 'cut' is not ambiguous, Searle says, 
yet it makes quite different contributions to the truth-conditions of the utterance in 'Bill 
cut the grass' and 'Sally cut the cake'. That is because background assumptions play 
a role in fixing satisfaction-conditions for the verb-phrase, and different background 
assumptions underlie the use of 'cut' in connection with grass and cakes respectively. 
We (defeasibly) assume that grass is cut in a certain way, and cakes in another way. 
Through enrichment the assumed way of cutting finds its way into the utterance's 
truth-conditions: 
 
Though the occurrence of the word "cut" is literal in [both] utterances..., and 
though the word is not ambiguous, it determines different sets of truth 
conditions for the different sentences. The sort of thing that constitutes cutting 
the grass is quite different from, e.g., the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a 
cake. One way to see this is to imagine what constitutes obeying the order to 
cut something. If someone tells me to cut the grass and I rush out and stab it 
with a knife, or if I am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a 
lawnmower, in each case I will have failed to obey the order. That is not what 
the speaker meant by his literal and serious utterance of the sentence. 
(Searle, 1980 : 222-3) 
 
Now an advocate of the Syncretic View will insist that a sentence such as 'Cut the 
grass' expresses something that has literal conditions of satisfaction quite 
independent of any background assumption; something very abstract, involving the 
constant meaning of 'cut' and not the variable senses it takes on particular uses (or 
types of use). Stabbing the grass with a knife and running over it with a lawnmower 
are two ways of literally obeying the order 'Cut the grass', on this view. But the 
contextualist remains skeptical. To get something genuinely evaluable, he claims, i.e. 
something which enables us to partition possible worlds into those in which the 
relevant condition is satisfied and those in which it is not, we need background 
assumptions (Searle, 1978). We cannot specify a determinate proposition which the 
sentence can be said literally to express, without building unarticulated assumptions 
into that proposition. The best we can do is to construct a disjunction of the 
propositions which could be determinately expressed by that sentence against 
alternative background assumptions. 
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In support of this controversial claim, Searle (1980) sets up an example for 
which no background assumption is readily available:  'Cut the sun'. What counts as 
obeying that order? We don't quite know. The abstract condition we can associate 
with that sentence (involving some form of linear separation affecting the integrity of 
the sun) is, precisely, too abstract to enable us to tell the worlds in which the 
condition is satisfied from the worlds in which it is not. It is not determinate enough to 
give us specific truth-conditions or obedience-conditions. 
In previous writings I gave a real-life example of the phenomenon Searle is 
drawing our attention to. 10 Consider the following dialogue from Desire, a film by 
Frank Borsage (1936): 
 
- Pedro! 
- Yes sir. 
- Take the plate to the kitchen and disarm the fricassee. 
 
What does the complex phrase 'disarm the fricassee' literally mean? It is hard to tell, 
even though we know the meanings of all the constituents. To make sense of that 
phrase, we must know the context. In the film, the context is as follows: (i) Gary 
Cooper (the speaker) is handing a fricassee plate to the waiter (Pedro); (ii) the 
fricassee plate contains a gun; (iii) that gun has just fallen from the hands of 
someone during a brief fight around the dinner table. With respect to that situation, 
the phrase 'disarm the fricassee' makes sense: it means that the waiter is to remove 
the gun from the plate. Without a proper background, however, we no more know the 
obedience conditions of Cooper’s utterance ‘Disarm the fricassee’ than we know the 
obedience conditions of  'Cut the sun'. 
In these examples, composing the senses of the parts so as to get a coherent 
sense for the whole involves imagining (or retrieving from memory) a possible 
scenario in which the senses of the parts fit together. That imaginative exercise 
involves elaborating what the meanings of the words give us — going beyond that 
linguistic meaning and, for example, interpreting 'disarm' in the specific sense of 'take 
the gun out of' or 'remove the gun from'. 
As we shall see, a more radical version of Contextualism denies that words 
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like 'cut' possess a determinate sense: the constant meaning of 'cut' is more like an 
abstract schema which has to be fleshed out in context, and that is why elaboration is 
needed to get a determinate proposition. But the Pragmatic Composition view traces 
the need for modulation to the composition process, and some examples clearly 
support that view. Thus consider the adjective 'red'. Vagueness notwithstanding, it 
expresses a definite property: the property of being red or having the colour red. That 
property could, in principle, go into the interpretation of a sentence in which the 
adjective 'red' occurs. (For example: 'Imagine a red surface.') But in most cases the 
following question will arise: what is it for the thing talked about to count as having 
that colour? Unless that question is answered, the utterance ascribing redness to the 
thing talked about (John's car, say) will not be truth-evaluable. It is not enough to 
know the colour that is in question (red) and the thing to which that colour is ascribed 
(John's car). To fix the utterance's truth-conditions, we need to know something more 
— something which the meanings of the words do not and cannot give us: we need 
to know what it is for that thing (or for that sort of thing) to count as being that colour. 
What is it for a car, a bird, a house, a pen, or a pair of shoes to count as red? To 
answer such questions, we need to appeal to background assumptions and world 
knowledge.11 Linguistic competence does not suffice: pragmatic fine-tuning is called 
                                            
11
  ‘For a bird to be red (in the normal case), it should have most of the surface of its body red, though not its 
beak, legs, eyes, and of course its inner organs. Furthermore, the red color should be the bird's natural color, 
since we normally regard a bird as being « really » red even if it is painted white all over. A kitchen table, on the 
other hand, is red even if it is only painted red, and even if its « natural » color underneath the paint is, say, 
white. Morever, for a table to be red only its upper surface needs to be red, but not necessarily its legs and its 
bottom surface. Similarly, a red apple, as Quine pointed out, needs to be red only on the outside, but a red hat 
needs to be red only in its external upper surface, a red crystal is red both inside and outside, and a red 
watermelon is red only inside. For a book to be red is for its cover but not necessarily for its inner pages to be 
mostly red, while for a newspaper to be red is for all of its pages to be red. For a house to be red is for its outside 
walls, but not necessarily its roof (and windows and door) to be mostly red, while a red car must be red in its 
external surface including its roof (but not its windows, wheels, bumper, etc.). A red star only needs to appear 
red from the earth, a red glaze needs to be red only after it is fired, and a red mist or a red powder are red not 
simply inside or ouside. A red pen need not even have any red part (the ink may turn red only when in contact 
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for. 
To sum up, on the view (PC) under discussion, even if the semantic content of 
a word is fixed by language (and context, if the expression is indexical), composing it 
with the contents of other words often requires help from above. It is semantic 
composition which has a fundamentally pragmatic character. So there is a sense in 
which modulation is necessary, but that is not quite the sense in which indexical 
resolution is. With indexical resolution there is a semantic gap and an instruction to fill 
the gap — both the gap and the instruction being part of the linguistic meaning of the 
expression. With modulation, there need be no gap and there is no instruction to 
search for some contextual filler. The expression means something, and that 
meaning could go into the interpretation — so modulation is optional — but to 
determine a suitable sense for complex expressions, we need to go beyond the 
meaning of individual words and creatively enrich or otherwise adjust what we are 
given in virtue purely of linguistic meaning. We must go beyond linguistic meaning, 
without being linguistically instructed to do so, if we are to make sense of the 
utterance. 
 
IV. Literalist Responses to the Contextualist Challenge 
 
According to Emma Borg (and other defenders of the Syncretic View), the fact that 
we are unable to specify intuitive conditions of application for the predicate 'cut the 
sun' does not support the contextualist conclusion that sentences per se do not have 
truth-conditions. There is, she claims, a crucial difference between ‘knowledge of 
truth-conditions and the knowledge that truth-conditions are satisfied’ (Borg, 
forthcoming). We may know the obedience-conditions of 'Cut the sun' in a purely 
'disquotational' manner (i.e. we may know that 'Cut the sun' is obeyed iff the 
addressee cuts the sun), without knowing what counts as cutting the sun, in the 
context at hand. So there is no reason to deny sentences genuine truth-conditions. 
The sentence 'Oscar cuts the sun' does possess truth-conditions; such truth-
conditions are determined by a recursive truth-theory for the language, which issues 
                                                                                                                                        
with the paper). In short, what counts for one type of thing to be red is not what counts for another.’ (Lahav, 
1989 : 264) 
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theorems such as 'Oscar cuts the sun is true iff Oscar cuts the sun'. We know those 
truth-conditions provided we know the language. What we don't know, simply in 
virtue of knowing the language, is ‘a method of verification for those truth-conditions’ 
(ibid.). This, then, is the syncretist's ultimate reply to the contextualist. According to 
the syncretist, the contextualist is guilty of endorsing a form of (so-called) 
'verificationism'.12 
This move strikes me as an unacceptable weakening of the notion of truth-
condition. The central idea of truth-conditional semantics (as opposed to mere 
'translational semantics') is the idea that, via truth, we connect words and the world.13 
If we know the truth-conditions of a sentence, we know which state of affairs must 
hold for the sentence to be true. T-sentences display knowledge of truth-conditions in 
that sense only if the right-hand-side of the biconditional is used, that is, only if the 
necessary and sufficient condition which it states is transparent to the utterer of the 
T-sentence. If I say 'Oscar cuts the sun is true iff Oscar cuts the sun', without 
knowing what it is to 'cut the sun', then the T-sentence I utter no more counts as 
displaying knowledge of truth-conditions than if I utter it without knowing who Oscar is 
(i.e. if I use the name 'Oscar' deferentially, in such a way that the right hand side is 
not really used, but involves some kind of mention).14 
One may doubt the feasibility of referential or truth-conditional semantics and 
defend translational semantics as a viable alternative. I have heard (or read) 
                                            
12
 Ibid. The first occurrence of this line of reply to contextualism can be found in Marcelo Dascal’s discussion 
of Searle’s ‘Literal Meaning’ (Dascal, 1981 : 173-4). The most recent occurrence I have seen is in Cappelen and 
Lepore (forthcoming). 
13
 See Lewis (1970 : 18-19), Evans and McDowell (1976 : vii-xi). 
14
 As Harman pointed out, if pure disquotational knowledge counts as knowledge of truth-conditions (in a 
suitably weak sense), then knowledge of truth-conditions (in that sense) does not count as knowledge of 
meaning. ‘There is a sense in which we can know the truth conditions of an English sentence without knowing 
the first thing about the meaning of the English sentence. To borrow David Wiggins’s (1972) example, we might 
know that the sentence « All mimsy were the borogroves » is true if and only if all mimsy were the borogroves. 
However, in knowing this we would not know the first thing about the meaning of the sentence, « All mimsy 
were the borogroves ».’ (Harman, 1999 : 196) 
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arguments to that effect. My point however is that if we stick to the standard truth-
conditional project (as Davidsonians like Cappelen and Lepore surely ought to do) 
then we should not accept the syncretist’s claim that we somehow know the truth-
conditions of ‘Harry cut the sun’. (For we don’t.) 
The contextualist challenge is likely to elicit another unsatisfactory response, 
this time from the 'indexicalist'. To each dimension of contextual elaboration, the 
indexicalist may argue, there corresponds a slot in logical form, which must be filled 
for the utterance to say something definite. To illustrate that point, let us consider 
another contextualist example from Searle (1983 : 145-7). 
When we ask someone to open the door, the content of the request goes 
beyond what is linguistically encoded. Not only is it necessary for the addressee to 
identify the relevant door (i.e. to complete or otherwise enrich the incomplete definite 
description 'the door'). She must also determine in what sense the door must be 
'opened'. Besides doors and windows, eyes and wounds can be opened. Now if the 
addressee 'opened' the door by making an incision in it with a scalpel, as when 
opening a wound, she would not have satisfied the request. Still, in a special context, 
it could be that the request to open the door must be satisfied precisely by incising it 
by means of a scalpel. The manner of opening is thus defeasibly indicated by 
context, it is not determinable on the basis of just the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence (including the direct object of the verb). To be sure, we can make it explicit 
in the sentence itself by introducing supplementary details, but each addition of this 
sort cannot fail to introduce other underdeterminacies. If, for example, we add that 
the door must be opened 'with a key', we don't specify whether the key must be 
inserted into the lock or rather used like an axe to break the door open (Searle 1992 : 
182). However explicit the sentence, there will always be some aspect of truth-
conditional content that is contextually determined without being explicitly articulated. 
At this point, the imagined indexicalist response consists in saying that, like all 
verbs, 'open' (or 'disarm' or 'cut') is associated with a complex frame15, involving a  
certain number of argument roles: a location playing the role of INSIDE; another 
location operating as OUTSIDE; a BOUNDARY separating the two; a MOVING OBJECT 
liable to pass from inside to outside (or the other way round); an OBSTACLE, that is, an 
                                            
15
 The notion of frame which I am using is that elaborated by Fillmore in a series of papers. See Fillmore (1976, 
1982, 1985), and Fillmore and Atkins (1992). 
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entity preventing the passage of the moving object; an AGENT liable to free the 
passage by means of ACTION on the obstacle; an INSTRUMENT serving to accomplish 
the action; and so on and so forth. In context, each of the variables I have 
enumerated must be assigned a particular value: the INSIDE, the OUTSIDE, the 
OBSTACLE, the PATH etc., all must be contextually identified. In the case of 'opening a 
wound', the INSIDE is the interior of the wound, the OUTSIDE is the exterior of the body, 
the MOVING OBJECT are the internal secretions of the wound and so on. This 
contextual assignment of values to the variables is what determines the specific 
interpretation given to 'open' in a particular context, and it is is no different from what 
is required for interpreting a context-sensitive expression. It is therefore unnecessary 
to modify semantic theory in order to give an account of Searle's examples; it is 
enough to extend the list of context-sensitive expressions, so as to include all verbs 
(insofar as they are all associated with frames which comprise a number of argument 
roles, the fillers of which must be contextually assigned). 
This indexicalist response is no more convincing than the syncretist response 
was. Let's admit that the verb 'to open' is associated with the complex frame I have 
mentioned. Does that make it an indexical or context-sensitive expression, whose 
use triggers, indeed mandates, a contextual process of value assignment? No. There 
is an important difference between the argument roles of a frame and the indexical 
variables associated with context-sensitive expressions. Indexical variables must be 
contextually assigned values for the expression to acquire a definite semantic 
content. If the referent of 'he' in 'He boarded John's boat' is not contextually specified, 
or if the relation between John and the boat remains indefinite, the utterance does 
not have definite truth conditions. In contrast, the argument roles of a frame may but 
need not be assigned contextual values. The contextual assignment process is 
optional; it may, or may not, take place, depending on what is contextually relevant. 
In other words, it is the context (not the sentence) which determines which, among 
the many argument roles of a given frame, are contextually assigned particular 
values, and which remain indefinite (existentially quantified). In many contexts, it is of 
no importance whether the door is opened with a key or in another way; what counts 
is simply that it is opened. To be sure, for any given verb (or verb plus syntactic 
context), there is a small number of argument roles in the frame for which the 
contextual assignment of value is linguistically mandated; but the indexicalist 
response presupposes something much stronger: that the verb 'open' is like an 
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indexical expression, which acquires a definite content only when the argument roles 
of the associated frame (all the argument roles, insofar at they can all be contextually 
foregrounded) are contextually assigned values. That is evidently too strong. In a 
given context, many of the argument roles which feature in the frame are existentially 
quantified rather than contextually assigned values. This does not prevent the verb 
'open' from expressing a definite content, in such a context. 
To sum up, for indexicals it is the conventional meaning of the expression 
which triggers the process of indexical resolution and makes it mandatory. With 
ordinary expressions such as 'open', it is the context, not the conventional meaning of 
the expression, which is responsible for foregrounding certain aspects of the 
described situation and triggering a process of contextual specification which goes 
well beyond what is linguistically encoded. The process in question is top-down, not 
bottom up. It is a pragmatically controlled pragmatic process, rather than a 
linguistically controlled pragmatic process, like indexical resolution. 
 
V. Radical Contextualism 
 
PC is not the only possible contextualist position. According to another one  — the 
Wrong Format view (WF) — it is not just semantic composition which requires 
adjustment and modulation of word meaning. Individual word meanings themselves 
are such that they could not go directly into the interpretation. They do not have the 
proper format for that. They are either too abstract and schematic, in such a way that 
elaboration or fleshing out is needed to reach a determinate content; or they are too 
rich and must undergo 'feature-cancellation', or some other screening process 
through which some aspects will be backgrounded and others focussed on. Note that 
there are versions of this view which take the meaning of a word to consist both in 
some abstract schema in need of elaboration and a large store of encyclopedic 
representations most of which must be screened off as irrelevant, on any particular 
use. 
WF is more radical than PC, but a third contextualist position, Meaning 
Eliminativism (ME), is by far the most radical: it is a sort of WF pushed to the 
extremes. That position comes close to what I think Austin and Wittgenstein had in 
mind. Let me introduce it by contrasting it with WF. 
According to WF, the sense expressed by an expression must always be 
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contextually constructed on the basis of the (overly rich or overly abstract) meaning, 
or semantic potential, of the word type. Just as the reference of an indexical 
expression is not linguistically given but must be contextually determined, the sense 
of an ordinary expression is not linguistically given but must be constructed. In that 
framework there still is a role for the linguistic meaning of word types: it is the input 
(or part of the input) to the construction process. 
The difference between Meaning Eliminativism (ME) and WF is that, according 
to ME, we don't need linguistic meanings even to serve as input to the construction 
process. The senses that are the words' contributions to contents are constructed, 
but the construction can proceed without the help of conventional, context-
independent word meanings. 
 Note that, according to a trivial extension of WF, the linguistic meaning of a 
word is not merely the input to the process of semantic modulation: it is also the 
output of a process of induction through which the child, or anyone learning the 
language, abstracts the meaning of the word from the specific senses which it 
expresses, or seems to express, on the observed occasions of use. It is a truism that 
the child or language learner starts not with pre-formatted linguistic meanings, but 
with actual uses of words and the contextualised senses that words assume on such 
uses. So both contextualised senses and context-independent linguistic meanings 
are input, and both are output, in some construction process. The linguistic meaning 
of a word type is the output of an abstraction process; that process takes as input the 
contextualised senses used as evidence by the language learner. On the other hand, 
the linguistic meaning of a word type also serves as input to the modulation process 
which yields as output the contextualised sense of the word on a particular occasion 
of use (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
ME purports to simplify WF by suppressing the intermediary step (linguistic 
meaning) and computing directly the contextual sense which an expression assumes 
contextualised        contextualised 
senses     linguistic meaning    senses 
    (abstraction)    (modulation) 
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on a particular occasion of use on the basis of the contextual senses which that 
expression had on previous occasions of use — without ever abstracting, or needing 
to abstract, 'the' linguistic meaning of the expression type.16 This amounts to merging 
the two construction processes: the abstraction of meaning from use, and the 
modulation of meaning in use (Figure 2). According to ME, there is a single process 
of abstraction-modulation which takes as input previous uses of the expression and 
yields as output the contextual sense assumed by the expression on the current use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
On the resulting picture, words are not primitively associated with abstract 
'conditions of application', constituting their conventional meaning (as on the Fregean 
picture). The conditions of application for words must be contextually determined, like 
the reference of indexicals. What words, qua linguistic types, are associated with are 
not abstract conditions of application, but rather particular applications. 
 In the spirit of Wittgenstein, consider what it is for someone to learn a 
predicate P. The learner, whom I'll call Tom, observes the application of P in a 
particular situation S1; he associates P and S1. At this stage, the semantic potential of 
P for Tom is the fact that P is applicable to S1. In a new situation S2, Tom will judge 
                                            
16
 For a detailed psychological model supporting ME, see Hintzman (1986, 1988). 
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that P applies only if he finds that S2 sufficiently resembles S1. To be sure, it is 
possible for S2 to resemble S1 in a way that is not pertinent for the application of P. 
The application of P to S2 will then be judged faulty by the community, who will 
correct Tom. The learning phase for Tom consists in noting a sufficient number of 
situations which, like S1, legitimate the application of P, as opposed to those, like S2, 
which do not legitimate it. The semantic potential of P for Tom at the end of his 
learning phase can thus be thought of as a collection of legitimate situations of 
application; that is, a collection of situations such that the members of the community 
agree that P applies in or to those situations. The situations in question are the 
source-situations. The future applications of P will be underpinned, in Tom's usage, 
by the judgement that the situation of application (or target-situation) is similar to the 
source-situations. 
 In this theory the semantic potential of P is a collection of source-situations, 
and the conditions of application of P in a given use, involving a given target-situation 
S3, are a set of features which S3 must possess to be similar to the source-situations. 
The set of features in question, and so the conditions of application for P, will not be 
the same for all uses; it is going to depend, among other things, on the target-
situation. One target-situation can be similar to the source-situations in certain 
respects and another target-situation can be similar to them in different respects. But 
the contextual variability of the conditions of application does not end there. Even 
when the target-situation is fixed, the relevant dimensions for evaluating the similarity 
between that situation and the source-situations remain underdetermined: those 
dimensions will vary as a function of the subject of conversation, the concerns of the 
speech participants, etc. 
 One particularly important factor in the contextual variation is the relevant 
'contrast set'. As Tversky (1977) has pointed out, judgements of similarity are very 
much affected by variations along that dimension. If we ask which country, Sweden 
or Hungary, most resembles Austria (without specifying the relevant dimension of 
similarity), the answer will depend on the set of countries considered. If that set 
includes not just Sweden, Hungary and Austria but also Poland, then Sweden will be 
judged more like Austria than Hungary; but if the last of the four countries considered 
is Norway and not Poland, then it is Hungary which will be judged more like Austria 
than Sweden. The explanation for that fact is simple. Poland and Hungary have 
certain salient geopolitical features in common which can serve as basis for the 
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classification: Hungary and Poland are then put together and opposed to Austria and 
Sweden. If we replace Poland by Norway in the contrast set a new principle of 
classification emerges, based on the salient features shared by Norway and Sweden: 
in this new classification Hungary and Austria go together. Tversky concludes that 
judgements of similarity appeal to features having a high 'diagnostic value' (or 
classificatory significance), and that the diagnostic value of features itself depends on 
the available contrast set. 
So the set of similarity features on which sense depends itself depends upon 
the relevant contrast set, and the relevant contrast set depends upon the current 
interests of the conversational participants. It follows that one can, by simply shifting 
the background interests ascribed to the conversational participants, change the 
truth-conditions of a given utterance, even though the facts (including the target-
situation) don't change, and the semantic values of indexicals remain fixed. Charles 
Travis has produced dozens of examples of this phenomenon of truth-conditional 
shiftiness over the last thirty years, and his examples often involve manipulating the 
relevant contrast-set.17  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have discussed a number of positions, going from the early literalists' 
                                            
17
 See Travis (1975, 1981, 1989, 2000). The following example, inspired from  Austin, is taken almost at 
random from a list of Travis-examples compiled by Claudia Bianchi (then a graduate student of mine): 
Fred is walking with his young nephew beside a pond where a decoy duck is floating. Pointing 
to the decoy, he says, ‘That's a duck’. Again we might ask whether what he said is true or false. 
But again, the above description is not enough for us to tell. If Fred has just finished laughing 
at a sportsman who blasted a decoy out of the pond, and if he has been trying to show his 
nephew how to avoid similar mistakes, then what he said is false. But suppose that Fred and his 
nephew are attending the annual national decoy exhibition, and the boy has been having 
trouble distinguishing ducks from geese. Then what Fred said may well be true. It would also 
be true had Fred said what he did in pointing out the fact that all the other ducks were poor 
copies (perhaps on the order of Donald Duck). (Travis, 1975 : 51) 
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blatant underestimation of context-sensitivity, to the most radical form of 
Contextualism. The positions are: 
 
• Proto-Literalism 
• Eternalism 
• Conventionalism 
• Indexicalism 
• The Syncretic View 
• Quasi-Contextualism 
• PC 
• WF 
• Meaning Eliminativism 
 
The first four positions stand squarely on the literalist side; the last three, squarely on 
the contextualist side. The Syncretic View and Quasi-Contextualism fall in between. 
Literalism, in general, minimizes context-sensitivity. It strives at preserving the 
view that the proposition expressed by a (complete) sentence is the linguistic 
meaning of that sentence — or one of its meanings, if the sentence is ambiguous. 
The only exception that is allowed for is indexicality, which is not considered as a 
threat to the general picture because it is a form of context-sensitivity which remains 
under linguistic control. Indexicalism goes as far as to generalize indexicality in order 
to protect semantic content from ‘top-down’ or ‘strong’ pragmatic effects — a form of 
context-sensitivity that is not under linguistic control. 
Such an exclusion of ‘top-down’ or ‘strong’ pragmatic effects on truth-
conditions I find dogmatic. If we give up the stronger forms of Literalism and admit 
that the content of an utterance is not entirely fixed by linguistic rules, but has to be 
contextually determined by making sense of the speaker’s speech act, is it not 
obvious that some aspects of content may happen to be contributed entirely by 
context ? Why insist that all aspects of content must be traceable to aspects of 
linguistic form, if not because one is still in the grip of the literalist prejudice ? 
 Minimalism can be defended, by explicitly going stipulative. One may grant the 
existence, or at least the possibility, of strong pragmatic effects, while defining ‘the 
proposition literally expressed by an utterance’ in such a way that it can only satisfy 
the minimalist constraint. In other words, one may draw a distinction between what is 
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said in the intuitive sense — the actual content of one’s utterance — and the 
proposition which can be assigned to that utterance as its ‘literal’ content, i.e. the 
minimal content that results from contextually assigning values to all indexical or free 
variables. That is the gist of the ‘Syncretic View’. In this framework the proposition 
literally expressed satisfies Minimalism by definition : it does not incorporate the 
output of pragmatic processes unless they are mandatory and triggered by elements 
in the syntactic structure of the sentence. 
 What is the point of positing such a minimal proposition? As I have 
emphasized, it is unclear that it plays any role in the actual process of interpretation. 
This much must be conceded to the quasi-contextualist. It has been argued that we 
need the minimal proposition to account for ‘the character of the information available 
to the hearer’ (Bach, 1994 : 158). The minimal proposition, Bach says, is ‘included in 
the information available to the hearer in understanding an utterance’ (Bach, 1994 : 
159). What this means, presumably, is that the hearer knows the literal semantic 
values of the constituents, and knows the appropriate composition rules. He should 
therefore be credited with the ability to compose those values so as to determine the 
literal semantic value of the whole — the minimal proposition. In practice, that need 
not be done. Since modulation takes place locally, the interpreter does not actually 
compose the literal semantic values of the constituents to determine the minimal 
proposition ; rather, he directly determines what is said (in the intuitive sense) by 
composing the pragmatic values resulting from whatever pragmatic processes locally 
operate on the literal semantic values of the constituents. Be that as it may, the 
minimal proposition is said to be ‘available to the hearer, even if not actually 
accessed’ (Bach, 1994 : 158). The interpreter does not compute it, but he could. 
Full-fledged Contextualism questions the claim that, independent of 
modulation, it is possible to determine a minimal proposition by mechanically 
composing the meanings of the constituents. I have briefly indicated the sort of 
argument a contextualist may put forward in support of this denial, but the issue is far 
from being settled. My intention was not to argue for (or against) Contextualism in 
this paper, but only to convince you that the debate ought to take place. This means 
that we must get rid of the last literalist prejudice: we must stop presupposing that 
there is such a thing as the minimal proposition expressed by an utterance. It is 
important to realize that that literalist assumption, pervasive though it is among 
philosophers of language, rests on a substantial and highly controversial conception 
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of both word meaning and sentence meaning. There is no reason to rule out, a priori, 
a contextualist account of word and sentence meaning, even if such an account 
entails the nonexistence of ‘minimal propositions’. 
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